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Abstract
We examine whether the recent behavior of real estate investors had
an e↵ect on housing a↵ordability between 2007 and 2014. We analyze investors’ purchasing and selling behavior and study their spillover e↵ects on
the a↵ordability of the local real estate market where they invest. We find
that large portfolio investors decrease the a↵ordability in neighborhoods,
reselling a property bought at the 37th percentile at the 70th percentile of
the market. We also find that in order to maximize yield, investors tend
to invest in poorer neighborhoods, leading to a decrease in a↵ordability
for lower income population wanting to buy a property in these areas.
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Introduction

Housing and economic recovery has been widely debated in the past few years.1
The current recovery has been quite slow but home sales seem to have actually increased contrary to the current trend of increased number of renters and
decreasing home ownership. Such a trend may be explained by the fact that
investors have done a large portion of the buying over the past five years. Real
estate investment has historically been a source of fast and strong returns for
investors.2 In this paper, we explore the e↵ect of investors on the real estate
market on the a↵ordability of homes.
The a↵ordability measure can be simply defined by how much real estate
household can a↵ord with their income. Simply put, households need to spend
some of their income on their rent or their mortgage and might not have a
large enough amount left for other necessities like food or other fundamental
consumptions. Unfortunately, the academic literature does not have a housing a↵ordability standard measure (Thalmann (2003), Bertaud (2009)). It is
usually measured by the cost burden (ratio of housing cost to household income) (Kutty (2005)) considering the ratio of current median or mean market
value of the standard housing unit to the median or mean disposable income of
the household (Chen et al. (2010)). The usual thresholds considered are 25%,
30%, 40%, and 50% price-to-income ratio. Households exceeding those ratios
are considered households with a housing a↵ordability problem (Kutty (2005)).
In particular, the U.S Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
defines una↵ordability as a more than 30 percent of income. This ratio su↵ers
from several shortcomings: a lack of integration of households’ preferences for
di↵erent housing qualities (Bogdon and Can (1997), Kutty (2005)); a potentially large variation amongst households (Stone (2006)) and within acceptable
percentages left for non-housing expenditures. Therefore a residual income approach, taking into account household composition and size is usually preferred
(Stone (2006)). Hulse et al. (2010) consider housing a↵ordability as the di↵erence between housing costs and the residual income after housing costs. This
measure, albeit more accurate, may be difficult to evaluate as standards for adequacy might vary within households and neighborhoods. Moreover, Leishman
and Rowley (2012) explain that a real measure of a↵ordability needs to control
for the quantity and quality of the homes available, the households’ housing
demand and requirements, and location or neighborhood e↵ects.
This paper contributes to the academic literature by analyzing the e↵ect of
investors’ presence on a↵ordability. More specifically, we argue that investors
tend to increase housing quality and prices in neighborhoods, which in turn
raises the housing costs for lower income households. Using a novel dataset over
the period 2008-2014, we find that investors get an average return of 100.4%,
1 Bracke (2013) shows that in OECD countries upturns and downturns have some duration
dependence and that house prices are cyclical.
2 See, for example, Do investor home sales mask a sick housing market?, Housing Wire,
February 6, 2014. http://www.housingwire.com/articles/28875-do-investor-home-sales-maska-sick-housing-market. Last accessed 04/20/2015.
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due to the fact that most investors decide to rehab or upgrade homes, compared
to 35.8% for non-rehabbed homes.3 This translates into an inflated sell price
for homes in neighborhoods where investors have placed their bets, leading to
lower a↵ordability for middle-class families.
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Data

We construct a novel dataset using di↵erent sources. We first get investors
data from Core Logic Investor datasest, which comprises investors and the price
and coordinates of the properties they bought. The data contains names and
addresses of the businesses but does not provide a full address of the properties. In order to match the properties with the investors, we use the Midwest
Real Estate Data (MRED) from 2007-2014, the data listing aggregator from
the Chicago area multiple listing service, usually known as MLS.4 It contains
information about each property on the market with the listing date, sale date,
list and sale prices, and all of the home characteristics. It also contains pictures and descriptions from the real estate broker. We determine the investor
activity by matching the tax number of each of the properties in the Core Logic
sample with the tax number for each home address in the MRED dataset. We
manage to match 78% of investor properties. Some of the investor properties
were matched multiple times on the MLS (as the property experienced multiple
transactions—sometimes before the investor transaction; sometimes after). We
will use these repeated sales as a robustness check for our results. We correct for
some inconsistencies with the dates of acquisition between MLS and Core Logic
dataset as the “closed date” from the MLS dataset and the “acquisition date”
in the Core Logic dataset may not match. We only consider observations with
both dates within a week of each other to avoid possible quick turnarounds. We
collected data on all the matched homes, focusing on the critical information
typically used by a potential buyer: size (in square feet), number of bedrooms,
number of bathrooms, year built, buyer and seller realtor names, past sale history, school rating, as well as all realtor-uploaded photos and the realtor’s text
remark. Additionally, we obtain post-sale information such as the final sale
date and final price. We get the public school ranking from the School Digger website and match school boundaries to properties or neighborhoods. We
measure distances to the downtown area or the nearest school. We calculate
the coordinates of the schools and the downtown area and measure the distance
between those and each property in our sample. The vacancy rates, auction
rates and foreclosure rates come from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). We use the median income data from the Census
Bureau with the ACS 5 Year Surveys (2007-2011, 2008-2012, 2009-2013).5 The
3 Those yields are measured in gross terms, without controlling for rehabilitation or upgrade
costs. If we use an average measure of costs, the yield is 52.5%.
4 The choice of the time period is central to our analysis as we wanted to make sure to
avoid the real estate bubble. Most non-institutional investors have disappeared around 2007
after large monetary losses. Our study focuses on the beginning of the new investment cycle.
5 We also use the IRS and BEA files as a robustness check.
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turnover rates are calculated from MRED MLS, HUD Aggregated USPS Administrative Data On Address Vacancies. We also use some measures of increase
in inequalities with the Census and the American Community Survey. Following
Choi and Greene (2015) we control for disparities within a community like labor
force participation, racial concentration, industrial composition and residential
mobility.
We also build a rental market dataset. During times when resale prices
are lower, investors rent their properties rather than sell at a lower price. We
match the rental properties as follows. We consider all investor sales matched
with Core Logic and MLS as defined above and match the data that has MLS
purchase and sales prices based on location and transaction. We then match
the investor sales with rental listings using both addresses and coordinates of
the properties, as the MLS did not provide tax numbers for rental listings. The
matching is done at the decimal level, which corresponds roughly to a 15-meter
radius. We then ensure that the street number and the address are matched
correctly. We match successfully 2,329 properties with rental listing, i.e. around
30% of the total matched observations. This is mainly due to the fact that we
only measure broker-listed rental properties. Some other properties could also
be listed on a rental market that does not rely on MLS, like Craigslist or direct
rentals.
We assemble a dataset for 2014 of home sales with mortgage, buyer and
seller information data. We go through each listing on our sale matched dataset
in 2014 and match by hand the data on buyer and seller to follow the properties
buyers and sellers, using a Core Logic data set connected to the MLS. From this
data source, we collected the identity of the buyer and whether the buyer took
out a mortgage – detailing the type of loan, the rate, and term length.6
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Investors Home Buying Trends: Where and
What Do They Buy?

The period 2007-2014 considered for this paper has witnessed a huge change in
real estate activity. We can see on Figure 1 that the average sales price was on
the decline over the period 2007-2012. Since 2012, home prices have rebounded
in value. A similar pattern of investor activity can be seen on Figure 2. Investors
have had an increasing presence on the market. They only represented around
4% of all of the total home sales activity until 2012. After 2012, investor activity
peaked at 7%. Figure 1 shows more specifically the investors purchase activity for the Chicago metropolitan area. In Figure 1 we divide more specifically
investors into two types of firms: (1) corporate institutional institutions, like
Blackstone and American Homes 4 Rent, and (2) non-institutional investors, or
local investors that usually hold a portfolio of less than ten properties, like JC
real estate. We can see that in 2012-2013 there was a huge increase in institu6 This process also validated the initial matching algorithm as we were able to confirm the
seller entity and the historical transactions on the property.
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tional investors’ activity, quadruple the amount of total residential transactions
compared to 2011. A similar pattern exists for non-institutional investors, with
the slight change that those investors were buying more properties during the
recession periods. We find that institutional investors have more than ten properties on average, whereas non-institutional ones hold less than ten.
Figure 3 also shows the investors activity in the Chicago Metropolitan area.
We notice that there is a large increase in investor activity in zip codes with
more than 10% or 20% activity over time.7
We present in Figure 4 and Figure 5 heat maps of investors’ activity and median income. We notice that investors avoid high income areas, as any potential
marginal return over time is small. Based on these maps, we find that investors
flood lower area income in the south corner of the map, with lower income and
more growth potential. Nonetheless we see that investors usually spread out,
which suggests that they try to use their local expertise to pick neighborhoods
in which they invest.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the key variables for our study, using
both institutional and non-institutional investors. Non-institutional investors
tend to hold more properties overall. They are also more invested in the local
market (88% vs. 59.7%). Their premium is usually higher than for institutional
investors. Institutional investors also hold fewer properties but tend to have a lot
of investment outside of the state. It is an interesting result, as contrary to the
non-institutional investors, they could acquire properties using their subsidiaries
in other states.
More interestingly, non-institutional investors tend to invest closer to their
headquarters, as they have a local experience and knowledge of the market (i.e.
closer to their headquarters), compared to institutional investors. Table 2 summarizes the results of this measure of the distance between acquired properties
and buyers’ headquarters. We geocode the addresses of the headquarters of
each of the investment firms in our sample and measure the distance between
any property investors buy and their respective headquarters. We find that
the majority of non-institutional investors tend to acquire properties close to
their headquarters: more than 70% are within 10 miles, with 50% less than 5
miles away. On the contrary, institutional investors acquire only 20% of their
properties within 5 miles of their location. Overall, institutional investors tend
to diversify their acquisition portfolios with respect to location. This seems to
emphasize the fact that non-institutional investors have more local knowledge.
It also implies that institutional investors in real estate behave like stock buyers,
mixing their portfolios in terms of neighborhoods and prices.
These patterns will be important to compare when developing some of our
results. A surprising and telling result shows that Blackstone buys in higher
proportions away from where non-institutional investors usually buy. Most of
7 For

all figures, the drop in 2014 is only due to the fact that the first quarter in 2014 has
been fairly low in investments (as are usually winters) and the investors activity for that year
has been the quarter number multiplied by 4. As soon as the data for the full year becomes
available we will include it in the sample. Most results are calculated both with and without
the 2014 data.
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their acquisitions are in less a✏uent areas like the south suburbs of Chicago.
Figure 6 shows how Blackstone’s buying behavior compares to its competitors.
We notice that Blackstone buys a lot of properties in the south east portion
of Illinois, presumably because it is betting on the development of this area,
mainly in Oak Lawn and portions of the city of Chicago.
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Investors Returns on Sold Properties

We build a dataset of matched properties to see whether the non-institutional or
institutional investors gain the most from their investments. In order to follow
properties over time, we match the Core Logic investor data to the MLS sales
data in the Chicago Metro Area. We only consider the Chicago Metro Area to
avoid having too many changes in the considered area. For example, suburbs
further away from Chicago might have characteristics that are di↵erent from
those closer to the city of Chicago. Table 3 presents the results of the matching.
Given that the datasets are presented di↵erently, we consider a match when
the list date is before the acquisition date and the closed date is after the
acquisition date. Alternatively, if a list date comes after the acquisition date, it
would almost have to guarantee a sale, likely a quick sale. Table 3 reports the
results of the matching. To be conservative, we consider only perfect matches,
explaining the decrease in the number of observations in our sample. Overall
we have 641 matched properties that we can follow over time, 534 for noninstitutional and 107 for institutional investors. We show in Figure 6 a map of
the investor activity data matched through our process. We divide the groups
into Blackstone, our main institutional investor, other institutional investors,
and the smaller investors. We notice that the match data spans the entire
state and that institutional and non-institutional investors buy mostly in similar
areas.
Table 4 presents the premium calculation for non-institutional and institutional investors using the matched dataset as well as the average turnover. We
notice that on average non-institutional investors sell the properties faster than
their institutional counterparts, albeit also holding on to it for around 2 years
over the period 2007-2014. This may be due to the 2008 recession or to the fact
that most properties are bought in lower income neighborhoods, where investors
expect a turnaround, and spent time renovating or remodeling them. We tested
both assumptions. The recession had a small e↵ect on the time on the market,
but most properties in the matched dataset were bought in the lower price time
period after 2009. The second proposition was tested as follows: we considered
the descriptions of the properties, prior and post investor’s involvement. Using
the MLS data, we used a series of words that would imply that the homes were
upgraded. Table 5 presents all the words used in the analysis.8 Table 6 presents
the results of the analysis. We find that 60% of the matched sample has some
8 The word used where picked from a real estate disctionary on rehabilitation and upgrades
of homes. The list presented in Table 5 will be updated based on another list from construction
and rehabilitation companies.
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form of renovation within their MLS description. We reviewed the descriptions
and considered a conservative approach, considering as no match for renovation
any unclear description, even if some upgrades could be infered from the listing
itself. Using the stratified approach of levels of renovations, we find in Table 7
that the premium is greatly derived from the renovations of the properties. On
the matched data, the average sold premium is 112.4% for renovated properties,
compared to only 35.8% on average for non-renovated properties.9 We also find
that it seems harder to resale a property that did not have any renovation (1,070
days on average) compared to one that has been renovated (483 days).
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Investors A↵ordability E↵ect

We consider how investors change sales prices within a given neighborhood as a
result of their presence and investment behavior. More specifically we estimate
the equation:
log(pit ) = ↵ + Xit + Iit

(1)

where pit is the sales price of the home, Xit corresponds to all controls on the
home and community, and Iit is a dummy variable corresponding to an investor
purchase. We control for year fixed e↵ects and proximity to downtown. We also
want to check whether any e↵ect of auctioned homes could change the results.
In order to fully control for investors’ presence within a community we include
the investor rate within that community. It is defined as the ratio of the number
of properties bought by investors over the total amount of properties sold in the
year prior to the closing date of a given property.10
Table 8 presents the results. We find that overall there is a significantly
positive e↵ect on price, albeit small for investors purchasing activity. This
might be due to the fact that investors are expected to invest in the property
they buy to make the neighborhood better or the intrinsic fact that investors
tend to have large premium, leading real estate brokers to anticipate higher sale
prices in the future. Investor are also less likely to negociate prices down as
they buy multiple properties to diversify their risks.11
In order to compare how the investors’ presence a↵ects a community, we
consider a similar regression, controlling for sales and purchases by di↵erent
types of investors. Table 9 shows the results of the regression of the sales
prices in a given neighborhood as a function of investors overall activity, selling
and buying, controlling for all of the local community, property characteristics
9 As mentioned earlier, the average sold premium becomes 52.5% considering the average
cost of renovation. Note that we present those results in the raw/gross premium form as costs
may di↵er per renovated home. It may be more complicated to have a clear comparison.
10 Note that investors mostly invest in lower income neighborhoods. It is consistent with a
potentially higher premium when homes sell. Investors’ presence a↵ects the di↵erent neighborhoods pricing themselves for purchases and sales of homes.
11 From interviews with investors in real estate, we found out that most of them do not
actually visit the homes they will eventually make an o↵er on.
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and year fixed e↵ects.12 We find that on average there is a positive e↵ect on
homes prices of both the sales and purchases of properties by investors. Overall,
institutional investors have a larger e↵ect than the non-institutional ones. It is
consistent with the fact that investors overpay for homes on average when they
purchase them and get a higher return when they sell them. We also notice
that homes sold by investors tend to sell at a higher price, more than 10 times
the larger price paid by investors at time of buying. This comparison validates
the higher purchase price of a property initially as investors know that they will
then have a larger yield at time of resale.
Investors seem to buy properties at a higher price within a neighborhood.
We try to measure the determinants of investors’ home purchasing decision. We
compare how purchase price might change considering the portfolio count for
each investor, whether the investor is institutional or not, the auction e↵ect,
distance to their headquarters. We also control for local community, property
characteristics, year fixed e↵ects, proximity to the city center, and the investor
rate in the neighborhood. Table 10 reports the results. Overall the coefficients
are robust to the choice of specification and we find that institutions seem to buy
at a lower price than non-institutional ones. Properties bought at an auction
have an expected price that is lower on average. The distance seems to also
play a role as investors pay on average a higher price a home closer to their
headquarters. This could be related to the fact that investors might feel more
comfortable with their knowledge of the prices in their area. In particular, noninstitutional investors might be more willing to pay a higher price to buy a
property closer to their headquarters. They also know the type of competition
they may face within their close neighborhood.
We estimate how the premium is impacted by neighborhood characteristics.
Investors tend to invest in lower income neighborhoods, but if schools and income measures improve over time, the premium may become larger. Table 11
presents the results. We notice that the median income has a negative e↵ect on
the resale premium. It is consistent with the lower probability of investors buying properties in higher income areas. We also find that the better the school
rank, the larger the premium. It is a consistent result with prospective buyers
focusing on neighborhoods with good quality schools. We also find that vacancy
rates have a negative e↵ect on the premium. Interestingly, the foreclosure rate
in the neighborhood seems to have a positive e↵ect on the premium. It may
be due to the fact that investors actually buy a portion of the foreclosed homes
and rehabilitate them.
We measure the impact of e↵ect of investors’ presence on nearby properties.
We consider properties that are close enough to the investor-owned property,
within one mile. We try to find the e↵ect within cluster of high investors presence, where we identify hotspots where lots of investors have purchased homes
within an area very quickly. Table 12 presents the results of a regression of the
e↵ect on sales prices of properties one mile nearby an investor cluster. We find
12 Similarly to the previous model, we control for auction and investor rate within a neighborhood.
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that a year after the cluster, homes are expected to be on average more expensive. We also find that there is a small and significant negative e↵ect on prices
of homes within the cluster. This e↵ect is somewhat controlled for potentially
auction rates.
Table 13 goes into details on what are the main characteristics that investor
purchasing would have on the local real estate market. We consider the e↵ect
on investor activity per zip as a function of foreclosure rate, income, school
quality, vacancy rates, and location within city limits. We find that overall
investors tend to invest in higher foreclosure area, with lower income and low
school quality, but with low vacancy rates. Locations at the periphery of the
city are also preferred. This is consistent with the development of areas around
the city of Chicago where more potential for high returns could be seen. It is
also consistent with the heat maps from Figure 4 and Figure 5.
An important impact of investors’ presence in a neighborhood is the role in
price setting in a neighborhood. We use a measure of a↵ordability based on
people’s income within a neighborhood and investment or mortgage companies
as a percentage of income. Given lower interest rates on mortgages, more potential buyers should be able to have access to credit to buy a property. We
find that interestingly investors’ presence leads to a decrease in a↵ordability of
home prices and rent in a neighborhood.
We also measure how the investors, in particular Blackstone, change the
a↵ordability of real estate in neighborhoods in which they acquire properties.
We consider the level of a↵ordability based on di↵erent ratios of income to
rent. More specifically, we consider 20%, 30%, and 40% of the income. We
think of a↵ordability as the ability of renters to be able to buy a home within
a particular area, using a portion of their income. We find that controlling for
area controls and property controls, that Blackstone usually decreases potential
buyers’ ability to a↵ord a home. Table 14 reports the result for using the
20% percent rent to income ratio, Table 15 for the 30% percent rent-to-income
ratio, and Table 16 for the 40% rent-to-income ratio. All of those tables also
account for potential robustness checks. Table 17 summarizes the results for
the full specification. We find that Blackstone adds an extra level of decreased
a↵ordability when compared to other investors. This e↵ect tends to disappear
when we consider the 40th percentile (with only a 9% increase in the price
potential buyers need to add to other properties sold by institutional investors)
but it adds more than 18% to the institutional investors price.
We consider di↵erent measures of yield for investors. We use first a yield
based on purchase price. The issue with it is that the results could be misleading considering that institutional investors invested more recently compared to
smaller investors that purchased their properties earlier. We control the yield
using the FHFA index for the Chicago Metro Area. It has the nice property
that it is available for more than 10 years back but is only at a larger area
than a zip code control. Another way to control for it is using the average MLS
sales within the year of the sale. We construct a distribution of the homes sold
around an investor purchase and we compared that particular distribution to
the properties sold at the time the property the investor is selling. Table 18
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presents the results using FHFA index. Table 19 uses zip code-level transactions. The results o↵er the perspective that on average institutional buyers get
an adjusted acquisition price lower than their non-institutional counterparts.
The overall average is actually similar for both normalizations.
The results in Table 18 were used in the regression results presented in
Table 17. Even though Blackstone’s home price is much lower than the other
investors—the a↵ordability of these houses is much lower. This seems to indicate
that Blackstone is comparatively overcharging for rent and that their pricing is
less a↵ordable to the community.
Using a sample of home matched in 2014 using buyers and sellers names,
we measure how investor-owned home prices and mortgages di↵er depending on
whether another investor or a regular buyer acquires it. We identified “investor
buyers” as those with names like “LLC or Inc.”. The complete list is shown in
Table 26. In total, Table 27 indicates that investors tend to sell 7.8% homes
to other investors. Table 28 indicates investors sell 14.0% of their properties to
cash buyers. This usually leads to an increase in prices within the neighborhood,
even for non-remodeled homes. It may be due to the access to cheap credit and
that some investors want to build a portfolio of properties while some other
investors welcome the sale.
In a way, the fact that the property was bought by an investor seems to
give the buyer-investor a strong signal that the property and the neighborhood
have an upside. Table 31 details a probit regression to estimate the likelihood
of whether the property was sold back to an investor. Investors seem to buy
properties from investors with large portfolios, as well as properties that are
more a↵ordable to the community. However, on the whole, investors seem to
buy in less desirable areas where the high school rank is comparatively lower.
The result also shows that investors rarely buy from investors who own multiple
properties in an area. This may be because the original selling investor has more
knowledge of the neighborhood and is confident to sell back to the community
for a better profit.
We also look in detail at the average rank of the home that is purchased
by the investor. Table 29 indicates that at the time of purchase, the property
is valued at around the 37th percentile with respect to what is being sold on
the market. When the investor sells the property, it is sold around the 70th
percentile. This is due to a combination of the property gaining value with
remodeling or the property possibly being overvalued by a new buyer.
In a sense, because investors are purchasing lower value houses, they are removing available housing stock for lower income households in the area. When
an institutional investor (an investor with more than 10 properties) sells a property back to the consumer, it appears that they sell the property at a comparatively una↵ordable rate. Even though Table 30 seems to indicate that both
types of properties are comparable at an aggregate a↵ordability level, when
controlling for property characteristics and local community fixed e↵ects, Table
31 indicates that institutional investors are selling properties at una↵ordable
rates. This seems to indicate that institutional investors are over-charging for
properties lower quality properties, burdening lower income individuals.
10

We look in detail at the types of mortgages that individuals take out when
purchasing investor owned homes. We considered the mortgage and transaction
history on the property individually through the Core Logic database. We
estimate the monthly ownership cost that is a combination of tax and monthly
mortgage payments. We use the tax on the property from the MLS listing.
The equation for the monthly ownership cost is:
P =L

r(1 + r)n
(1 + r)n 1

(2)

where L is the loan amount, r is monthly rate, and n is the number of
months.13 We approximated some of the values when missing using the sold
price of the house as the default principal, the national average default rate for
2014 and 30 years for time of mortgage, as it is the average number of years.
We find that a substantially higher number of individuals take out FHA loans
for low income individuals who cannot a↵ord a down payment on the purchased
home when purchasing from investors when compared to the average type of
loan available. It may be that a higher concentration of individuals buying from
investors take out FHA loans because the properties are more una↵ordable for
them. Table 21 and Table 22 indicates that the share of the individuals buying
investor properties is much higher than the national average for 2014. Table 25
indicates that individuals buying homes at low to mid-level price cannot a↵ord
a large downpayment (between 4 and 10%). It seems to indicate that the buyers
do not have the appropriate assets to purchase the home.

6

Interpretation and Discussion

Overall investors tend to have a very large return on their investments. This
may be due to the period of analysis as the market has bottomed out in 2009.
Nonetheless, the overall returns have been around 14% overall for non-renovated
homes, and more than 90% for renovated homes. It seems important to note that
homes have overall been held for around a year for renovated homes and sold at
a high premium. Non-renovated homes have been in the investors portfolio for
more than 3 years on average. It might seem to imply that investors might have
either tried to wait for the market to rebound, or see if the development of the
area would happen, or perhaps they rented the home for a few years to ensure
a cash-flow for a period of time when the real estate market was not providing
large returns. Another interesting pattern for investors is the fact that they
tend to invest in neighborhoods with lower income and less developments. The
advantage is that if those neighborhoods become more attractive investors can
reap higher returns. The idea behind it might be that investors use low interest
rates to buy more properties. Also their initial purchases prices are lower than
they would be in more saturated markets. Interestingly, those increases in prices
in lower income neighborhood may positively a↵ect house prices of borrowers
13 We

normalize to use the monthly schedule.
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whose property is underwater. They may be able to refinance their loans at a
lower rate, decreasing the probability of default. In the end, both e↵ects are
at play in the investor-heavy neighborhoods: renters wanting to become owners
cannot a↵ord as many homes as they previously could, but current homeowners
benefit from the appreciation of their homes due to investors’ presence. That
being said, if a substantial number of investors were to sell their properties in
bulk, these home prices may drop back down to normal levels.
A strong insight of this paper is the fact that smaller sized investors tend to
invest in more localized neighborhoods around their headquarters. This strategy
seems to provide strong returns, but at the price of a lower diversification,
leading to smaller returns overall in both renovated and non-renovated homes.
This implies that local governments may be able to stimulate housing prices by
providing smaller-sized investors tax breaks or other incentives to locate to their
communities. It means that one of the solutions to the a↵ordability problem is
a mix of investor buying with only a small footprint in the neighborhoods, to
avoid a larger increase in prices.

7

Conclusion

In this paper we provide some results that deepen our understanding of the buying and selling behavior of investors, di↵erentiating them into institutional and
non-institutional investors to better understand their impact on the community
in terms of a↵ordability. We find that investors tend to invest in properties in
lower income area, have larger returns (double their investments), and tend to
increase home prices in neighborhoods by investing in them. This tends to lead
to an increase in una↵ordability of neighborhoods during times when incomes
are mainly flat.
We also confirm that the increase of prices is also the result of investors’
resale of properties, with a large number of properties on the market being sold
between investors.
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